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1 Introduction
Capital inflows are a fundamental element in
economic performance. Such inflows are essential
to finance investment and economic policy is
sensitive to the mobility of capital given the
globalisation of capital markets. Economic policy
and performance influences inflows and these
inflows in turnhave implications for macroeconomic
management. The economic implications will
depend on the type of inflow, whether official (aid)
or private capital.Developing countries, including
the poorest (predominantly, but not exclusively, in
sub-Saharan Africa), are trying to attract increased
levels of private inflows, especially foreign direct
investment (FDI) but also other (short-term)private
capital. This article reports results, with a central
focus on sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA),on capital inflows
to identify trends and volatility (the extent of year-
on-year changes) of different types of inflows and
evaluate the influences for economic policy. Since
the 1970s, what have been the trends in the level
and composition of capital flows to developing
countries, and what are the economic implications?
The analysis shows that although private capital
flows to developing countries remain low (relative
to gross domestic product, GDP), especially for the
poorest countries, the 1990s have witnessed an
increase. Although aid remains themost important
capital inflow (relative to GDP) for developing
countries, again especially the poorest, the
composition is changing towards private inflows.
Whilemany would consider this increase in private
inflows tobedesirable, there are associatedproblems.
Short-term(non-FDI) private capital is shown to be
themost volatile type of inflow, i.e. there canbe large
year-on-year variations in the level of the flow (and
large outflows are possible). If the composition of
capital inflows is changing such that a greater share
of inflows is inherently short term and mobile (i.e.
volatile), there are implications for macroeconomic
management. Governments want to reduce aid
inflows and increase private inflows, so they aim for
macroeconomic stability andgrowth.However, large
inflows of private capital can undermine
macroeconomic stability. Indeed, the volatility of
private capital (the threat of an outflow) can
precipitate an economic crisis even in countries with
sound macroeconomic policies. This danger is
explored in later parts of this article.
The article is organised as follows: Section 2
reports on the trends in different types of capital
inflow, official and private, for developing countries
(classified according to relative income) since the
1970s. The poorest countries are found to have
become increasingly dependent on official (aid)
inflows, although private inflows have begun to
increase recently. Section 3 then considers the
differences in the volatility of such inflows. Private
inflows are found to be more volatile than official
inflows.Although only relatively richer developing
countries attract sufficient private inflows for this
to be a matter of real concern, private inflows are
increasing to poor countries. Section 4 presents a
brief discussion of the determinants of capital
inflows, to indicate the economicpolicies that attract
private inflows. The conclusion in Section 5
considers the policy implications. The objective is
to contribute to our understanding of how poor
countries can influence and manage the
composition of capital inflows.
2 Trends in composition of capital
inflows
Private capital flows to developing countries
increased substantially during the 1990s. Net
private capital flows to low- and middle-income
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countries increased, in nominal terms, from
US$42.6 billion (of which US$24.1 billion was
FDI) in 1990 toUS$267.7 billion (US$170.9 billion
in FDI) in 1998 (World Bank 2000: 336).Net aid
flows to developing countries declined during the
period, from someUS$60 billion in 1993 toUS$55
billion in 1998 (World Bank 2000: 344).However,
Gabriele et al. (2000) show that private capital
inflows are increasingly concentrated in a small
group of emergingmarkets, while most developing
countries continue to face a severe scarcity of
external resources. The composition has shifted
in favour of private flows: these were about two-
thirds of the total in the 1970s, fell to 54 per cent
in the 1980s, but rose thereafter and reached 80
per cent in the 1990s. Aid to developing countries
reached a peak in relative terms in 1986 (at 25 per
cent of inflows) then declined, falling below 10
per cent of total inflows from 1993.Other official
flows have been unstable, surging in particular in
1995 and 1998 due to official intervention in the
Mexican and Asian crises. The composition of
private flows also changed – bank loans declined
while both FDI (which is highly concentrated in
a small number of countries) and portfolio inflows
increased.
The volumeof capital flows to SSA also increased
in the 1990s, although estimates vary according to
the source of data (Bhinda et al. 1999). There is a
tendency for international organisations to
underestimate the scale of capital flows given
difficulties in collecting and assembling comparable
data from national sources. Although only a small
fraction of global FDI, FDI to SSA tripled between
1992 and 1995, growing fastest in some of the least
developed economies, includingTanzania, Uganda
andGhana.The InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF)
andWorld Bank report that portfolio equity inflows
are also rising fastest in SSA among developing
country regions, albeit from a very low base. The
level of net inflows through bank loans has
decreased in SSA, although net short-term flows
have risen in some countries, such as Tanzania since
1996 (Bhinda et al, 1999). Thus, private inflows
are increasing and, although they remain low for
most poor countries, they are rising quickly for
some countries.
There are many different types of capital flow,
and their importance to specific countries differs.
The analysis concentrates on four types of capital
flows – two private (FDI and other private capital,
OPC), and two official: official development
assistance and official development finance (ODA
and ODF). Remittances are important inflows to
developing countries, but could not be separately
identified; in the statistics used, they could be
classed as FDI or OPC. The definitions used were:
n Foreign direct investment (FDI): net inflows of
investment with the aim of acquiring a lasting
management interest in a firm or enterprise.
These are generally considered as relatively long-
term flows.
n Other private capital (OPC): commercial bank
lending, bonds, other private credit, non-debt
flows and portfolio equity investments (excludes
FDI). These are mostly short-term flows.
n Official development assistance (ODA): net
disbursements of aid, grants and loans by the
official sector at concessional financial terms.
n Official development finance (ODF): net
disbursements of ODA plus non-concessional
resources frommultilateral and bilateral sources
(including refinancing loans).
The level and composition of these flows can be
expected to differ according to the level of
development of different countries. Therefore, the
developing countries in our sample are classified
into four groups:
1. Low-income countries (LICs): economies in
which per capita gross national product (GNP)
in 1998 was at most US$760. There are 29
countries in this group in our sample.
2. Lower-middle income countries (LMICs), in
which per capita GNP in 1998 was within the
rangeUS$760 toUS$3,030 (19 countries in this
sample).
3. Upper-middle income countries, (UMICs), in
which per capita GNP in 1998 was within the
range US$3,031 to US$9,360 (12 countries in
this sample).
4. Sub-SaharanAfrican countries – separate results
are presented for the 26 sub-Saharan African
countries in the sample (only two of which were
not LICs).
In general, the period under study is from 1970
to 1997 (for full details, seeOsei et al. 2002). Table
1 summarises trends in the level of inflows (relative
to GDP) for each group of countries.
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Overall, the data shows that private inflows
peaked in the late 1970s, albeit at very low levels
for poor countries, but have declined steadily since
then. Even upper-middle income developing
countries recorded a poor performance on FDI and
OPC prior to the late 1990s, when both categories
exceeded 3 per cent ofGDP, but for those countries
FDI has been the larger inflow since themid-1980s.
The late 1990s witnessed a significant recovery in
FDI, possibly reflecting increased privatisation, and
a less pronounced increase inOPC (although there
was a net outflow in the early 1990s).Table 1 shows
that, in 1996–97, FDI inflows were larger than
during any of the previous 5-year periods (except
for sub-Saharan Africa).
These trends have continued into the 2000s:
FDI inflows to developing countries increased
steadily fromUS$152.7 billion in 1996 toUS$204.8
billion in 2001, and FDI to SSA (excluding South
Africa) increased from US$3.5 billion to US$5.2
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Table 1: Trends in capital inflows (ratios of GDP)
FDI OPC ODA ODF
Low-income countries 1970–1975 0.97 1.06 6.35 6.58
1976–1980 1.04 2.09 8.28 9.18
1981–1985 0.47 0.98 8.89 9.97
1986–1990 0.51 0.07 12.00 12.89
1991–1995 0.82 0.03 14.50 14.83
1996–1997 1.44 0.17 12.21 12.61
Entire period 0.82 0.81 10.03 10.68
Lower-middle income countries 1970–1975 1.20 1.35 3.23 3.56
1976–1980 1.13 2.35 4.49 5.23
1981–1985 0.84 1.44 4.03 5.12
1986–1990 1.32 0.54 4.18 5.04
1991–1995 1.93 0.15 3.40 4.21
1996–1997 2.62 1.29 2.09 2.80
Entire period 1.38 1.18 3.72 4.46
Upper-middle income countries 1970–1975 1.70 2.23 2.42 3.25
1976–1980 1.56 3.15 1.62 2.00
1981–1985 1.29 1.87 1.49 2.89
1986–1990 1.34 0.45 1.22 2.27
1991–1995 1.88 1.17 0.77 1.10
1996–1997 3.79 3.42 0.52 0.86
Entire Period 1.72 1.91 1.47 2.13
Sub-Saharan Africa 1970–1975 0.85 0.90 6.97 6.38
1976–1980 1.24 2.38 9.23 8.25
1981–1985 0.67 0.95 10.82 9.53
1986–1990 0.52 0.01 13.31 12.31
1991–1995 0.52 –0.02 14.53 14.31
1996–1997 1.03 0.35 11.88 11.96
Entire period 0.78 0.81 10.15 10.89
Notes: Figures are the mean for all countries in each sample of the average annual value of each capital flow
for each period. The samples comprise 29 LICs, 19 LMICs, 12 UMICs and 26 SSA countries (not all of which
are low-income).
Sources: Osei et al. (2002) and Morrissey (2003) for SSA.
billion over the same period (UNCTAD 2002:
303–304). By 2000, net private flows and FDI each
amounted to about 2 per cent of GDP for SSA
overall, although each was less than 1 per cent of
GDP for low-income countries as a group (World
Bank 2003: 238–241). Aid nevertheless remains
the most important inflow for most developing
countries, especially for the poorest.
In summary, Table 1 provides evidence that:
n Aid (ODAandODF) represents themajor source
of capital inflow for the poorest developing
countries (LICs and SSA). In rough terms, aid
was 3–6 times private inflows in the 1970s, and
about 13 times in the 1990s.
n Aid flows have become increasingly important
for poor countries, increasing from some 6–9
per cent ofGDP in the 1970s to 12–15 per cent
in the 1990s. Almost all of these aid flows are
in the formof overseas development assistance
(ODA). The non-concessional component of
official development finance (the difference
betweenODA andODF) accounts for less than
1 per cent ofGDP for the low-income countries
for all of the time periods.
n Private capital inflows (FDI andOPC together)
are very low for poor countries and have
declined, from just over 3 per cent of GDP in
the late 1970s to less than 2 per cent in the late
1990s (1996–97 in Table 1).
n For the poorest countries, FDI has been themost
important private inflow since the 1980s. Since
themid-1980s, other private capital (OPC) flows
have been less than 0.2 per cent of GDP.
n For LMICs, although aid was amore important
source of capital in the 1970s, private capital
inflows had become themore important inflow
by the late 1990s.
n Since the mid-1980s, FDI has been the most
important private capital inflow for LMICs (at
least twiceOPC).
n Private capital has always exceeded aid for
UMICs. Aid (ODF) as a percentage of GDP has
declined consistently to less than 1 per cent by
the late 1990s. FDI increased relative to OPC
for UMICs.
n Overall, total private capital inflows declined
between the peak of the late 1970s and trough
of the early 1990s, with OPC becoming less
important relative to FDI, for all groups of
countries.
Only the richer developing countries (UMICS)
attract significant volumes of FDI and other private
capital. Even for these countries, it was only the
late 1990s that both inflows exceeded 3 per cent
of GDP.
The trends confirm what would have been
expected a priori. Official flows, in particular aid,
are themost important for poor countries and have
become of increasing importance over time. Private
capital inflows declined (relative to GDP) during
the 1980s in particular. The decline in FDI inflows
had reversed by the late 1990s, but flows of other
private capital have only begun to recover in recent
years. The poorest countries have become
increasingly reliant on aid, attracting almost no
private capital and little FDI. Other (non-FDI)
private capital is only significant relative to GDP
for the UMICs.
3 Volatility of capital inflows
Some characteristics of the changing composition
of increased capital flows, as short-term private
capital becomes more important, can generate
serious problems (Gabriele et al. 2000). For
example, short-term inflows such as investing in
equity or bond markets are volatile and are thus a
less reliable source of capital inflow. Financial
liberalisation, by attracting short-term inflows,
exposes host countries to instability. Foreign
investors will have limited information about the
nature of the market in developing countries,
especially small ones, and will not be able tomonitor
how the funds are used locally. Foreign investors
tend to act together (herding) and respond quickly
to new information (which may reflect market
sentiment rather than actual macroeconomic
indicators), so rapid outflows may occur if
confidence in a country declines. Developing
countries are exposed to volatile private capital
flows and contagion effects (a lack of confidence
in onemarket quickly spreads to other countries).
The result is that an economic crisis can occur in a
country even wheremacroeconomic fundamentals
are sound.
Other types of capital inflow tend to be more
stable and predictable, and therefore pose fewer
challenges for macroeconomic management. FDI
is a relatively long-term commitment; while the
level of inflows may vary from year to year, outflows
of FDI are quite rare. Thus, FDI would be expected
to be less volatile than other private inflows.
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Similarly, although the level of aid inflows can vary
from year to year, aid would be expected to be less
volatile than other inflows. These expectations are
evaluated in our analysis, by considering volatility
of different types of inflows to developing countries.
We are here concerned with how volatile capital
flows have been. That is, we want measures that
capture the year-on-year variability of the flow, and
that summarise this volatility over the whole period.
In economic terms, themajor importance of capital
inflows is to finance investment (in the case of aid,
financing government spending in general is
important). Investment decisions require planning
and access to funds, so the predictability of inflows
is important. High volatility should be associated
with low predictability, andmay therefore discourage
investment. On the other hand, economic and
political instability in a country may discourage
inflows, and thus be associated with volatility.
Consequently, volatility is a useful indicator in two
respects – it captures disincentives to investment
and reflects instability in the economy. Both are
negatively associated with economic performance
– see Lensink andMorrissey (2000) in the context
of aid volatility, and Lensink andMorrissey (2001,
2002) in the context of FDI volatility.
For each type of inflow, we computed and
compared three different measures of volatility
(formal definitions can be found inOsei et al. 2002):
n The coefficient of variation (CoV): expresses the
standard deviation as a percentage of the mean
value for the series over time. This can be
interpreted as a simple statistical measure of
overall volatility during the period.
n The SDT Index: the standard deviation around
a simple time trend (SDT) (variations of this
measure are most commonly used in the
literature).This can be interpreted as de-trended
volatility over the period expressed as a
percentage of themean.A comparison between
theCoV and SDTmeasures indicates how much
of the volatility can be attributed to the trend
over time.Typically, the SDT index will be lower;
if it is considerably lower, this indicates that the
trend is important, whereas if the twomeasures
are quite close, there is no evident trend.
n The SDF Index: the standard deviation around
a forecast value (SDF), intended to represent
unanticipated volatility (this measure is
developed and explained in Osei et al. 2002).
Essentially, past values are used to forecast future
values so, in principle, the forecast trend can be
anticipated (from past values). The SDF Index
is based on the assumption that a forecast based
on recent values is a better representation of the
pattern than a simple time trend. If this
assumption is true, SDF volatility will be lower
than SDT, implying that one could predict or
anticipate some volatility by using the forecast
(compared with a time trend).
Table 2 presents all threemeasures for each flow
to each group of countries to indicate the range of
estimates of volatility over the period 1970–97. For
the LICs aid (ODA) is slightly more volatile than
ODF and for both CoV is much higher than either
index, implying that much of the overall variation
is due to trends. Volatility of aid flows to LICs is
14–18 per cent (of the mean). These official flows
are considerably less volatile than private flows.
Volatility of FDI to LICs was 45 per cent, but 70
per cent for OPC (SDF measure). The overall
volatility values for flows to SSA are given in the
last panel. It is evident that official flows (ODF) are
by far the least volatile, and these have followed a
significant trend (SDT is lower thanCoV).Volatility
of private capital flows has been much higher,
especially for OPC.While OPC was more volatile
than FDI, there is more evidence of a predictable
pattern (whereas there is no evidence for a trend
in FDI); the “forecast” (SDF) approach reduces the
estimate of volatility by almost a third compared
toCoV.We cannote that private flows to SSA exhibit
greater volatility than observed for low-income
countries as a group, and that this level of volatility
is higher than for lower-middle and upper-middle
income countries, irrespective of the volatility
measure employed.
For LMICs the overall volatility of aid flows is
24 per cent using the SDTmeasure and 15 per cent
for the SDF measure (suggesting that about one-
third of the volatility from a simple trend could be
“anticipated” using a forecast). The values for ODF
are similar. Thus, the volatility of official flows is
similar to that for the low-income countries, but
this volatility appears to be more predictable.
Instability of private flows to LMICs was higher
than for official inflows, 30–42 per cent for FDI
and 60–80 per cent for OPC.
As might be expected, instability for UMICs is
lowest for ODA at 13–15 per cent, but highest for
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ODF at 23–36 per cent. It is non-aid official flows
that aremost volatile (and note that non-aid official
flows are more important for UMICs). The SDF
measure is considerably lower than SDT, implying
that more than a third of instability can be captured
by the forecast as compared to the trend estimate.
Instability of private flows to UMICs was greater
than to LMICs for FDI at 39–46 per cent but lower
for OPC at 46–63 per cent. In all cases, SDF gave
lower instability than SDT, often considerably so
(implying that the forecast is a better representation
than a simple time trend). In general, the SDF
measure gives lower volatility, implying that analysts
for individual countries should attempt forecast
equations to get the “best” estimate of future flows
for policy and planning purposes.
In summary, Table 2 provides evidence that:
n official flows are less volatile than private flows;
n for most countries, ODA is slightly more volatile
than ODF (and most ODF in such countries
comprises ODA). Only in the UMIC group is
ODF more volatile than ODA, and in these
countries theODA share is relatively low;
n volatility in FDI is lower than in other private
flows, often considerably so;
n all capital inflows are, however, quite volatile
and in general most of this volatility is not
predictable;
n private capital flows to the LICs and SSA are
more volatile than flows to the lower-middle
and of the middle-income countries.
Osei et al. (2002) also present data on the trend
in volatility, based on the annual average change
in SDF in each period. In general, volatility was
greatest in the 1970s but has been declining (the
yearly average over the whole period is negative
in most cases). This is somewhat misleading as,
for most flows, volatility declined significantly in
the 1970s but has increased since then. FDI is the
only flow that has shown a steady decline in
volatility in all periods, while volatility ofOPC has
been increasing since (albeit not relative to) the
very volatile 1970s.
4 Determinants of capital inflows
Governments of developing countries generally
aim to attract private capital, partly because they
want to reduce dependence on aid and partly
because of the belief that private inflows are “good
for growth” (institutions such as the World Bank
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Table 2: Instability of capital flows (entire period, flows to all countries)
FDI OPC ODA ODF
Low-income countries CoV 47.68 113.14 31.89 29.98
SDT 48.52 93.51 14.47 13.39
SDF 44.59 69.54 17.85 16.82
Lower-middle income countries CoV 41.64 79.73 24.01 22.37
SDT 33.14 72.07 24.15 22.79
SDF 29.74 60.25 14.68 13.63
Upper-middle income countries CoV 46.24 62.99 44.02 46.56
SDT 44.36 60.82 14.50 35.87
SDF 38.80 46.36 13.36 22.60
Sub-Saharan Africa CoV 63.56 131.35 31.03 27.72
SDT 62.53 117.07 14.30 13.75
SDF 74.31 88.78 18.04 16.37
Notes: Estimates based on total flows for each category to all countries in each group. Instability
measures as defined in text.
Sources: Osei et al. (2002) and Morrissey (2003) for SSA.
and IMF typically promote private capital in this
way).While there is evidence that FDI contributes
to growth (Lensink andMorrissey 2001), the effect
is weak for developing countries (Lensink and
Morrissey 2002).We are not aware of any evidence
showing that other private capital contributes to
growth in developing countries (possibly because,
historically, the inflows have been small). In policy
terms it is quite important to distinguish FDI and
non-FDI private inflows. This is not only because
different factors may bemore important in attracting
each type of inflow, but also because governments
may prefer to attract one rather than the other. In
particular, FDI is generally amore stable source of
investment finance and presents fewer problems
of macroeconomic management than non-FDI
private inflows (as these short-term inflows tend
to be very volatile).
Private capital flows have usually been explained
by two sets of factors – the “push” and “pull” factors.
The push (external) factors relate to how economic
conditions in the source countries affect the volume
of global private capital flows.These external factors
explain total global private capital outflows rather
thanhow these flows are distributed across recipient
countries. The pull (or domestic) factors aim to
capture the determinants of cross-country variation
in private capital inflows. The basic finding is that
favourable macroeconomic performance increases
private returns on investments and attracts private
capital to the country. Two main channels are
identified.The first relates to the productivity gains
that result from increased confidence in the
macroeconomic environment. Private investors
move into these countries (or geographic regions)
to take advantage of these productivity gains. A
second channel is factors that make the receiving
country more creditworthy (e.g. a stable exchange
rate or falling debt burden).While studies have not
identified a definitive set of determinants of private
inflows, we identify some factors that are likely to
be important for private flows to poor developing
countries.
The following factors are quite consistently found
to influence FDI:
n Growth is certainly important in attracting FDI,
as such investment is seeking relatively long-
run opportunities.
n Trade is a significant factor associated with FDI,
and this applies to both importing and exporting.
Foreign investors appear to be attracted by more
open trade regimes, either producing import-
competing goods to serve the domesticmarket
or for export production. The former is more
likely if the market is growing, andmay also be
attracted by regional integration.
n FDI does not seem to be associated with other
capital inflows, whether private or official. In
other words, other than growth (which is an
influence on all capital inflows), the factors
influencing FDI seem to be independent of the
factors influencing other inflows. This may be
because FDI responds to country-specific
opportunities.
n Current FDI inflows are the best indicator of
future FDI, and FDI is the most stable private
capital inflow.
Few factors have been identified as robust
determinants of non-FDI private inflows to low-
income countries such as those in SSA. The level
of credit available to the private sector (an important
economic indicator for investors) is one of the few
factors consistently and positively associated with
short-term capital inflows. Financial liberalisation
may be the relevant policy option to attract non-
FDI private capital.Non-FDI private capital tends
to go only to richer countries, so sustained growth
is especially important. This is a reason why flows
to SSA and other poor countries are so low. There
is a negative association between aid inflows and
non-FDI private inflows. This is largely a reflection
of the fact that poorer countries receive more aid.
Thus, countries trying to attract increased private
capital should aim for economic growth and stable
macroeconomic indicators (especially keeping
control over domestic credit expansion). Trade
policy and country-specific factors (such as
availability of skilled labour or natural resources)
are important for FDI, but it is macroeconomic
factors that aremost important for non-FDI private
inflows. As discussed in the final section, private
capital inflows can affect, as well as being attracted
by,macroeconomic policy.
5 Conclusion: is volatility a cause
for concern?
The recent increase in global capital flows to
developing countries is a recovery (in terms of
inflows/GDP ratios) in comparison to a decline in
the 1980s. The volume of capital flows to low-
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income and SSA countries increased in the 1990s,
but most of the increase was accounted for by aid
(reflecting the generally poor economicperformance
of these countries). Only in the latter half of the
1990s (1996–97 in our data, but other sources
show a continuing trend) is there some evidence
of increasing private inflows, and most of this is
FDI.What we observe is that private capital flows
to low-income and SSA countries have been both
small (relative toGDP) andhighly volatile.Evidently,
poor countries have not succeeded in attracting
sustained inflows of private capital.
Private capital flows to SSA excluding FDI were
negligible at only about 0.35 per cent of GDP in
1996–97. A realistic target would be at least three
times this level: by the late 1990s, non-FDI private
flows amounted to over 3 per cent ofGDP in upper
middle-income countries and over 1 per cent in
lower middle-income countries. Private inflows
reached 2 per cent of GDP in SSA around 2000,
but it is not evident this has or can be sustained.
The danger with non-FDI private capital is that
volatility is very high. This poses challenges to
macroeconomic management and it is these that
we now consider.
5.1 Macroeconomic policy challenges
Shibata and Morrissey (2002) address the
macroeconomic implications of increased private
capital inflows to SSA in the context of theories of
financial crisis. Private capital flows, especially OPC,
are more volatile than official inflows and hence
pose a challenge to macroeconomic stability. A
sudden reversal of capital inflows was one factor
underlying the East Asian crisis of 1997 as it
contributed to a currency crisis. The literature on
the East Asian crisis has identified a number of
“crisis indicators”, such as the rate of domestic credit
expansion and level of foreign exchange reserves.
In particular, the nature of the exchange rate regime
is central to managing capital inflows and
vulnerability to crisis. Shibata andMorrissey (2002)
examine trends in exchange rate regimes and crisis
indicators for five SSA countries in the 1990s
(Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda).
Although none of the indicators suggest that
managing private flows posed a problem to the
economies prior to the latter half of the 1990s, there
were indications of potential problems if the volume
of volatile private inflows were to increase.
The major problem that is identified is the
prevalence of large trade deficits that could be
exacerbated by exchange rate appreciation.Capital
inflows are associated with pressures for
appreciation, which is attractive to investors,
whereas large current account deficits suggest the
need for devaluation, which meets trade policy
objectives (helps exporters). The conflicting
exchange rate pressures associated with capital
inflows and trade objectives need to be recognised
by policy makers. Investors can be expected to
monitor trade deficits, credit expansion, reserves
and exchange rate pressures. Consequently, the
domestic authorities responsible for managing
capital inflows should be aware of these indicators
of concern to investors.The analysis highlights two
specific issues for macroeconomicpolicy – exchange
rate management and exposure to risky
international capital markets.
First, many SSA countries have moved from a
fixed to floating exchange rate system since the
1980s, while actively trying to attract increasing
private capital inflows.Although this has met with
only limited success,many SSA countries (and other
developing countries) are facing increased exposure
to volatile private capital flows. This has created
pressure for a real appreciation inmany countries.
Countries could consider introducing some capital
controls while promoting domestic institutional
development in the financial and banking sectors.
Second, an increasing dependence on “volatile”
private foreign capital invites risk.Apotential source
of shock is the high level of trade deficits that may
be unsustainable in many countries. Foreign
investors tend to interpret a deficit as a sign of
imminent devaluation, which threatens the value
of their investments. Macroeconomic stability is
threatened by volatile capital flows controlled by
powerful private agents subject to unpredictable
herd behaviour.As information quality is relatively
low for poor countries in particular, and there are
likely to be many small investors, susceptibility to
herd behaviour is a potential problem.A particular
aim should be improving the quality of information
available to investors. One example is to provide
regular “investor briefings” that review the
performance of important indicators. The most
relevant indicators are the expansion of domestic
credit, the level of foreign reserves, the trade deficit
and exchange rate. Such information should be
made easily available and trustworthy. Institutions
such as the IMF and the World Bank could act in
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a financially expansive, counter-cyclical fashion to
offset herd behaviour, panic and contagion effects.
They could also, at least indirectly in their dealings
with the country, provide “authority” to the
information on indicators of the economy. It is
important, however, that it is the developing
countries themselves that are the providers of
information, perhaps through the Central Bank.
5.2 Policy implications
For themajority of developing countries, especially
the poorer ones (most SSA countries), the best
prospects for attracting private capital are in respect
of FDI.While sustained growth will attract foreign
investors, there aremany other factors that influence
FDI, especially insofar as it responds to specific
opportunities. Traditionally FDI has often reflected
natural resource endowments, especially in
extractive industries, and this will continue to be
important for certain countries.More generally and
recently, privatisation attracts foreign investors
(hence FDI).This can be complemented by policies
to increase the skill level of the workforce,
investment in general education and provision of
vocational training. Trade liberalisation, increased
openness, also appears to attract FDI. All of these
policies can be mutually reinforcing, as openness,
higher levels of human capital, and FDI, all tend
to contribute to growth.
The prospects for increasing short-term (non-
FDI) private capital inflows to SSA economies are
bleak. Private capital inflows are discouraged by
the instability and weak economic performance
that are features of poor countries. This may not
be a serious disadvantage, as short-term inflows
are volatile and pose problems for aspects of
macroeconomicmanagement. Short-term inflows
are easily reversed in response to changes inmarket
sentiment that are difficult to predict or control.
While some capital controls can limit exposure to
sudden outflows, the controls may distort FDI and
trade financing.Without controls, volatile capital
flows can create pressure on exchange rates and
capital account management. Economies with high
levels of short-term capital inflows are more
susceptible to financial crises. The major policy
dilemma is reconciling the conflicting pressures on
the exchange rate: private investors will tend to
favour appreciation, whereas trade objectives are
often better served by devaluation.
The conclusion is a brief one: the major issue
facing poor developing countries, such as SSA, is
not the problems associated with volatile private
capital inflows, it is (all the factors associated with)
the difficulty of attracting such inflows. To date,
SSA countries have failed to attract private capital
in significant amounts.Aid is themajor inflow, and
it is vital that aid is used effectively to promote
growth and stability. If this is achieved, the prospects
for attracting private inflows, especially FDI (which
offers the most promise) will improve. As short-
termprivate inflows increase, developing countries
will be exposed to volatility and contagion effects
(a lack of confidence in onemarket quickly spreads
to other countries). The result is that an economic
crisis can occur in a country even where
macroeconomic fundamentals are sound.The policy
action to reduce contagion effects is to provide
better quality information on the “state of the
economy” to investors. Themajor policy challenge
associated with an increase in short-term private
capital inflows relates to exchange ratemanagement
and policy makers should be aware of this.
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Notes
* This article is based on a study of ‘Capital Flows to
Developing Countries’, supported by a research grant
from DFID (R7624) as part of the Globalisation and
Poverty Research Programme (www.gapresearch.org).
Abbreviations
CoV coefficient of variation
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
GNP gross national product
LICs low income countries
LMICs lower-middle income countries
ODA official development assistance
ODF official development finance
OPC other private capital
SDF standard deviation around a forecast value
SDT the standard deviation around a simple time trend
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
UMICs upper-middle income countries
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